Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies by Lichter, Shaun et al.
1Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial
Oligopolies
Shaun Lichter, Terry Friesz, and Christopher Griffin
Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that networks with an arbitrary degree sequence may be a stable
solution to a network formation game. Further, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of
firms participating in collaborative efforts. In this paper, we show conditions under which a graph with
an arbitrary degree sequence is admitted as a stable firm collaboration graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been a rise in the number of firms participating in collaborative efforts.
Goyal and Joshi [4] present a model of firm collaboration in aspatial oligopolies and in this paper
we extend this model to spatial oligopolies. We investigate the impact of the spatial economy on
the collaboration network and the impact of the collaboration network on the spatial economy.
Since the 1960s the number of firm’s participating in collaborative agreements has increased
significantly [5]–[10]. This collaboration takes various forms, one of which is research and
development (R & D) that often consists of sharing resources such as equipment, laboratory
space, office space, as well as engineers and scientists through separate R & D subcompanies.
This collaboration has become very popular within industries that are R & D intensive. Hagedoorn
shows that the number of collaborations has increased since the 1960s and rapidly increased in the
1980s [7]. Firms in R & D intensive industries are enabled to flexibly ally themselves to further
their business. Nonetheless, the existence of these collaborations is counterintuitive because firms
should not want to share R & D results or expenditures because it is the foundation of their
future products. As a result of this contradiction, this collaboration has spurred a host of literature
[5]–[10]. Goyal and Joshi present a model of horizontal firm collaboration in oligopolies, where
firms compete in the market after choosing collaborators [4]. The motivation behind this model
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2is an examination of the incentives for collaboration and the interaction of these incentives with
market competition. Firms are able to lower production costs by committing some resources to
a pair-wise collaboration effort. A particular collaboration network is formed as a result of the
collection of pairwise collaborations. For each collaboration network, each firm has a particular
production cost which effects the market competition that occurs over this collaboration network.
Hence, the oligopoly induces an allocation of value over the set of firms for a given collaboration
network.
II. COLLABORATION NETWORKS AND COLLABORATIVE OLIGOPOLIES
In this section we present an introduction to collaboration networks and collaborative oligopolies.
We modify the notational conventions from the common notation in this this body of literature
[3], [12], [13] in order to better accomodate the spatial variables needed in later sections of this
paper. Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of nodes in a graph, which will represent players or a
group of players. The set of links in the graph is a set of pairs of nodes (subsets of N of size
two). A graph g is a set of links (set of subsets of N of size two) and gN is the complete set
of all links. The set G is the set of all graphs over the nodes N , that is, G = {g : g ⊂ gN}.
The value of a graph g is the total value produced by agents in the graph; we denote the value
of a graph as the function h : G → R and the set of of all such value functions as H . An
allocation rule Y : H ×G→ RN distributes the value h(g) among the agents in g. Denote the
value allocated to agent i as Yi(h, g). Since, the allocation rule must distribute the value of the
network to all players, it must be balanced; i.e.,
∑
i Yi(h, g) = h(g) for all (h, g) ∈ H ×G. The
allocation rule governs how the value is distributed and thus makes a significant contribution to
the model. Jackson and Wolinksy use pairwise stability to model stable networks without the
use of noncooperative games [13].
Definition II.1. A network g with value function h and allocation rule Y is pairwise stable if
(and only if):
1) for all ij ∈ g, Yi(h, g) ≥ Yi(h, g − ij) and
2) for all ij 6∈ g, if Yi(h, g + ij) > Yi(h, g), then Yj(h, g + ij) < Yj(h, g)
Pairwise stability implies that in a stable network, for each link that exists, (1) both players
must benefit from it and (2) if a link can provide benefit to both players, then it in fact must
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3exist. Jackson notes that pairwise stability may be too weak because it does not allow groups of
players to add or delete links, only pairs of players [12]. Deletion of multiple links simultaneously
has been considered in [1]. We present an application of the network formation game to firm
collaboration in spatial oligopolies, which is an extension to the firm collaboration presented by
Goyal and Joshi in [4].
A. General Collaborative Oligopoly Model
Consider n firms that compete in an oligopoly who may collaborate with any of the other
n− 1 firms. Firm i produces a quantity qi. Denote q = (q1, q2, . . . qn) as the vector of quantity
production across all firms and q−i = (q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+1, . . . qn) as the vector containing produc-
tion quantities for all firms, but firm i. Collaboration among firms affects the marginal cost of
production. Thus a particular (collaboration) graph g induces a marginal cost of firm i under
collaboration graph g of ci(qi|g).
We consider marginal cost functions of the form (1) where the marginal cost ci(qi|g) for firm
i is a function of qi, the quantity produced by firm i, and ηi(g), the degree of firm i in graph g.
ci(qi|g) = fi(qi, ηi(g)) (1)
Here, fi ∈ C1(Ωi) where qi ∈ Ωi and Ωi is defined as the feasible region for firm i.
Ωi = {qi : 0 ≤ qi}
Given a network g, there is an induced set of costs which, along with the demand functions,
produces a set of profit functions for each firm, Yi(g) (the allocation of payoff for player i).
These profit functions then induce a Nash equilibrium of production, which provides the precise
allocation rule (i.e., profit) for each firm on the graph. The stability of the collaboration network
can then be analyzed using the definition of stability II.1.
Denote the market marginal price function as P (q1, q2, . . . qn). In this paper, we consider a
market marginal price function (dependent on quantity produced) given by
P (q1, q2, . . . qn) = α−
∑
i∈N
qi (2)
This can also be denoted as P (Q) = α−Q where Q = ∑i∈N qi The profit for Player i is:
Yi(qi|q−i, g) =
(
α−
∑
i∈N
qi
)
qi − c(qi|g)qi (3)
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4Given collaboration graph g, firm i will solve the problem
max Yi(qi|q∗−i, g)
s.t. qi ∈ Ωi (4)
where q∗−i is composed of the optimal production quantities for all firms, but i. The gradient of
the objective for firm i:
∇qiYi(qi|q∗−i, g) = P (Q)− fi(qi, ηi(g))− qi − qi
∂fi
∂qi
Each firm i will solve an equivalent variational inequality by finding q∗i ∈ Ωi such that:
〈∇qiYi(qi|q∗−i, g), qi − q∗i 〉 ≥ 0 (5)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes a dot product. In this case:
〈P (Q)− fi(qi, ηi(g))− qi − qi∂fi
∂qi
, qi − q∗i 〉 ≥ 0 (6)
The equilibrium for this oligopoly can be found by solving the variational inequality defined
as finding q∗ ∈ Ω such that
〈∇qY (q|q∗, g),q− q∗〉 ≥ 0 (7)
where
[∇qY (q|q∗, g)]i = P (Q)− fi(qi, ηi(g))− qi − qi∂fi
∂qi
(8)
It is difficult to analytically determine which collaboration graphs will be stable because the
oligopoly equilibriums are solutions to a variational inequality. One could empirically find stable
graphs, but instead we seek to find subcases of the model for which we can find analytical results.
B. Previous Results on Network Stability in Aspatial Oligopoly
In Goyal and Joshi [4], it is assumed that the marginal cost of firm i linearly decreases with
the number of collaborators for firm i:
ci(g) = γ0 − γηi(g) (9)
where, as before, ηi(g) is the number of links for firm i and γ0 is the marginal cost of production
when a firm has no links. Notice that γ0 is constant for all firms. One example that Goyal and
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5Joshi [4] study is that of a homogenous product oligopoly. With the market marginal price
function (2) and marginal cost (9), the resulting profit to Player i is:
Yi(g) =
(
α−
∑
i∈N
qi
)
qi − (γ0 − γηi(g)) qi = (α− γ0)qi +
(∑
i∈N
qi
)
qi − (−γηi(g)) qi (10)
Goyal and Joshi show that with marginal cost (9) and market demand (2), the complete network
is the unique stable network [4].
C. Results of Nonlinear Cost on Stability
In this section we review the results from [14], where we show the effect a nonlinear variation
on the marginal cost function has on the stability of collaboration structures. In particular, we
show that with cost functions of a particular form, the collaborative oligopoly will result in
a stable collaboration graph with an arbitrary degree sequence. We consider a marginal cost
function:
ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)) (11)
where fi is some function fi : R→ R.
Lemma II.2. Suppose we have an oligopoly consisting of n firms in which collaboration is
defined by the graph g and the profit function (allocation rule) for Firm i in that oligopoly is
given by:
Yi(g) = (α− γ0)qi(g)−
(∑
j∈N
qj
)
qi(g)− fi(ηi(g))qi(g) (12)
then the quantity produced for firm i is:
qi(g) =
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
(13)
Proof: From [17], for any oligopoly with profit function of the form:
pii(q) = aqi −
(∑
j∈N
qj
)
qi − biqi (14)
The resulting Cournot equilibrium point on quantities is:
qi =
a− nbi +
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ 1
(15)
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6In our case, we have:
a = α− γ0
bi = fi(ηi(g)) ∀i
Substituting these definitions into Expression (15) yields Expression (13). This completes the
proof.
Remark II.3. It is worth noting that when for each firm i, bi = −γηi(g) then the cost function
(9) and induced equilibrium quantity (15) is equivalent to that used in Goyal and Joshi.
Corollary II.4. Suppose that f is a nonnegative (f(η) ≥ 0) convex function that has a minimum
at 0. Further, suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki) where ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. If the parameters
α and γ0 and the function f are such that:
α− γ0 − nmax{f(n− 1), f(1− n)} − 1
2
(n− 1) max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 (16)
and n ≥ 2, then the Cournot equilibrium quantities (13) are nonnegative for all firms and for
all collaboration graphs and the following inequalities hold:
2qi(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] > 0 (17)
2qi(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] > 0 (18)
Proof: Since n ≥ 2 and f is convex and has a minimum at 0, this implies that n−1
n+1
[f(1)−
f(0)] and n−1
n+1
[f(−1)− f(0)] are non-negative. If (17) and (18) hold, then qi(g) is non-negative
and hence it suffices to only show that (17) and (18) are implied by (16).
For all i, function fi is a convex function of the degree of node i in the graph g; the degree
of node i must take an integer value between 0 and n − 1, which due to the convexity of
fi and the fact that ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . n − 1} implies that the maximum of fi is equivalent to
max{fi(0), fi(n− 1)} and is less than max{f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1)}. That is,
fi(ηi(g)) ≤ max{fi(ηi(g))} = max{fi(0), fi(n− 1)} ≤ max{f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1)}
This means that (16) implies:
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g))− 1
2
(n− 1) max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 ∀i (19)
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7Since, all fi(ηi(g)) ≥ 0, we may add
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g)) to the left side of (19) without changing
the inequality:
α− γ0− nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i
fj(ηj(g))− 1
2
(n− 1) max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 ∀i (20)
Dividing by n+ 1 yields:
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
− 1
2
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)−f(0), f(−1)−f(0)) > 0 ∀i (21)
From Lemma II.2 this simplifies to:
qi(g)− 1
2
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 ∀i (22)
Multiplying through by two yields:
2qi(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] ∀i
2qi(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] ∀i
Now (17) and (18) immediately follow.
Remark II.5. This essentially means that the steeper a function f around zero and on the interval
(−n+ 1, n− 1), the greater the quantity α− γ0 is needed to ensure the theorem proved later in
this section. It is worth pointing out that this bound may often not be tight (i.e., the inequalities
may hold true and production quantities may be positive even when the condition is not met).
Theorem II.6. Suppose that f is a nonnegative (f(η) ≥ 0) convex function that has a minimum at
0. Further, suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)−ki). Define the change in f as 4−fi(ki) = fi(ki−1)−
fi(ki) = f(−1)−f(0) = 4−f(0) and 4+fi(ki) = fi(ki+1)−fi(ki) = f(1)−f(0) = 4+f(0).
Suppose n ≥ 2 firms compete in an oligopoly with market demand P = α −∑i∈N qi and
marginal costs ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)). If the parameters α and γ0 and the functions fi obey
condition (16), then the equivalence class of graphs [g]η such that ηi(g) = ki is an equivalence
class of stable collaboration graphs.
Proof: Let g be a graph in the equivalence class of graphs [g]η, that is, g has a degree
sequence such that ηi(g) = ki for all firms i. Consider a firm i who may consider dropping its
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8link with node j. If node i drops its link with node j leading to graph g−ij, then ηi(g−ij) = ki−1
and ηj(g − ij) = kj − 1, while ηr(g − ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}. Using Lemma II.2
qi =
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i∈N fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
(23)
Calculate:
qi(g − ij) = qi(g)−4−fi(ki)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4−fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qj(g − ij) = qj(g)−4−fj(kj)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qr(g − ij) = qr(g) +4−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+4−fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
It then follows that
Q(g − ij) = Q(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4−fi(ki) +4−fj(kj))
P (g − ij) = P (g) +
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4−fi(ki) +4−fj(kj))
ci(g − ij) = ci(g) +4−fi(ki)
Now, we can calculate Yi(g − ij) in terms of Yi(g):
Yi(g − ij) = qi(g − ij)[P (g − ij)− ci(g − ij)]
= Yi(g) + qi(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[4−fj(kj)− n4−fi(ki)] +
(
[4−fj(kj)− n4−fi(ki)]
n+ 1
)2
Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki) this implies that 4−fi(ki) = 4−fj(kj) and we obtain (24) and
then (25) and (26) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, by the assumptions of the theorem and
condition (16) each of the quantities 4−fi(ki), n−1n+1 , and 2qi(g)− n−1n+14−fi(ki) are nonnegative
implying (27).
Yi(g − ij)− Yi(g) = 2qi(g)4−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (4−fi(ki))2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(24)
= 4−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
4−fi(ki)
)
(25)
= −4−fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
4−fi(ki)
)
(26)
< 0 (27)
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9This implies that if firm i attempts to drop link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g − ij) and thus firm i
decreases its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to drop
a link from graph g. Now, we will consider the case where firm i attempts to add a link to the
graph g, giving g + ij under the assumption that the link ij does not exist in graph g. This
analysis will follow closely the analysis for g − ij. First note that ηi(g) = ki for all firms i and
ηi(g + ij) = ki + 1 and ηj(g + ij) = kj + 1, while ηr(g + ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}. We define
4+fi(ki) as 4+fi(ki) = fi(k + 1) − fi(k); note the subtle difference from the definition of
4−fi(ki). Again using Lemma II.2, we calculate the production quantity for each node in graph
g + ij:
qi(g + ij) = qi(g)−4+fi(ki)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4+fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qj(g + ij) = qj(g)−4+fj(kj)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qr(g + ij) = qr(g) +4+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+4+fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
We can then calculate the corresponding total production quantity Q, the market price P and
marginal costs for each player for the graph g + ij:
Q(g + ij) = Q(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4+fi(ki) +4+fj(kj))
P (g + ij) = P (g) +
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4+fi(ki) +4+fj(kj))
ci(g + ij) = ci(g) +4+fi(ki)
Now, we can calculate Yi(g + ij) in terms of Yi(g):
Yi(g + ij) = qi(g + ij)[P (g + ij)− ci(g + ij)]
= Yi(g) + qi(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[4+fj(kj)− n4+fi(ki)] +
(
[4+fj(kj)− n4+fi(ki)]
n+ 1
)2
Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki) this implies that 4+fi(ki) = 4+fj(kj) and we obtain (28) and
then (29) and (30) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, by the assumptions of the theorem
and condition (16), each of the quantities 4+fi(ki), n−1n+1 , and 2qi(g)− n−1n+14+fi(ki) are positive
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implying (31).
Yi(g + ij)− Yi(g) = 2qi(g)4+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (4+fi(ki))2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(28)
= 4+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
4+fi(ki)
)
(29)
= −4+fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
4+fi(ki)
)
(30)
< 0 (31)
This implies that if firm i attempts to add a link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g+ij) and the firm decreases
its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to add a link to graph
g. Since no firm has an incentive to add or drop a link to graph g, it is stable. This completes
the proof.
III. COLLABORATIVE SPATIAL OLIGOPOLIES
Spatial Oligopolies (Oligopolies on spatially separated markets) have been studied extensively
[2], [11], [15], [16]. In this section we extend the collaborative oligopoly model of Goyal and
Joshi by applying it to spatially separated markets and we extend the existing literature in
spatial oligopolies by allowing firm collaboration. We seek to find which graphs g are stable
collaboration graphs. As in prior sections, N = {1, 2, . . . n} will denote firms, which are nodes
on the collaboration graph. Alternatively, there is a spatial transport network with nodes denoted
as V = {1, 2, . . . v}. Consumer demand at transport node l ∈ V for firm i ∈ N is denoted as dli
and the total demand at node l is denoted as Dl =
∑
i dli. Denote the vector di = [dli]l∈V as
the demand vector for firm i across all nodes. The quantity produced by firm i is again denoted
as qi. Noting that qi =
∑
l∈V dli, we can eliminate qi by formulating all expressions in terms of
di = [dli]l∈V .
The induced price at node l is denoted as Pl(Dl) = Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln). The marginal pro-
duction cost is ci(qi|g) = fi(qi, ηi(g)) as before in (9) but is now denoted as ci(
∑
l∈V dli|g) =
fi(
∑
l∈V dli, ηi(g)). However, now there is an additional marginal cost to ship a unit of quantity
to node l for firm i denoted as sli 1. Define Yi(di|g) as the profit for firm i with collaboration
1Each firm is not explicitly placed on the transport network, but its location may be implied through the sli values
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graph g:
Yi(di|g) =
∑
l∈V
dli
[
pl(Dl)− sli − fi
(∑
l∈V
dli, ηi(g)
)]
Hence, the firm i will solve the problem
max Yi(di|g)
s.t. di ∈ Θi (32)
where Θi = {di : di ≥ 0}. We can calculate the gradient of the objective for firm i:
∇diYi(di) =
[
Pl(Dl)− sli − fi
(∑
l∈V
dli, ηi(g)
)
− dli − dli
∂fi(
∑
l∈V dli, ηi(g))
∂dli
]
l∈V
Each firm i will solve the equivalent variational inequality by finding d∗i ≥ 0 such that:
〈∇diYi(d∗i |g),di − d∗i 〉 ≥ 0 (33)
We may now find an equilibrium to the spatial oligopoly for all firms by solving the single
composed variational inequality. Find d∗ ≥ 0 such that:
〈∇dY (d∗|g),d− d∗〉 ≥ 0 (34)
Where d = [di]i∈N and Y (d∗|g) = [Yi(d∗i |g)]i∈N .
With such a spatial model, it again becomes difficult to analytically find stable graphs. Stability
is difficult to determine analytically because in order to determine if a link should exist, the value
a node receives from the link must be contrasted from the value without the link. This is difficult
without using sensitivity analysis for variational inequalities. Instead we seek to show a set of
models that do yield analytical results.
A. Nonlinear production costs in Spatial Collaborative Oligopoly
Consider a marginal cost function:
ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)) (35)
where fi is some function fi : R → R. The marginal cost to ship a unit of quantity to node l
for firm i is again denoted as sli. Each firm maximizes its profit by solving its own nonlinear
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problem:
max
∑
l∈V
dli[Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln)− sli − γ0 − fi(ηi(g))]
s.t. 0 ≤ dli ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V
Remark III.1. This nonlinear program that each firm will solve has been decoupled, such that
now at each transport node l, the firms participate in oligopolistic competition that is independent
from the competition at each other node. However, at each node, each firm has a different cost
due to the variability of the shipment cost to that node for each firm.
Lemma III.2. Suppose we have an oligopoly consisting of n firms in which collaboration is
defined by the graph g, the demand function at node l is Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln) = αl −
∑
i∈N dli,
and the profit function (allocation rule) for Firm i in that oligopoly is given by:
Yi(g, d1i, d2i, . . . , dli) =
∑
l∈V
dli[αl −
∑
j∈N
dlj − sli − γ0 − fi(ηi(g))] (36)
then the demand met at node l by firm i is:
dli =
αl − γ0 − n(sli + fi(ηi(g))) +
∑
j 6=i[slj + fj(ηj(g))]
n+ 1
(37)
Proof: The profit for firm i can be rearranged:
Yi(g, d1i, d2i, . . . , dli) =
∑
l∈V
dli[αl −
∑
j∈N
dlj − sli − γ0 − fi(ηi(g))]
=
∑
l∈V
(αl − γ0)dli −
(∑
j∈N
dlj
)
dli − (sli + fi(ηi(g))) dli
From [17], for any oligopoly with profit function of the form:
Yi(q) = aqi −
(∑
j∈N
qj
)
qi − biqi (38)
The resulting Cournot equilibrium point on quantities is:
qi =
a− nbi +
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ 1
(39)
In our case, we have an oligopoly at each location l and quantities dli with parameters :
a = αl − γ0
bi = sli + fi(ηi(g)) ∀i
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Substituting these definitions into Expression (39) yields Expression (37). This completes the
proof.
Corollary III.3. Suppose that f is a nonnegative (f(η) ≥ 0) convex function that has a minimum
at 0. Further, suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki) where ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. If the function f
and parameters α, γ0, and s are such that:
α− γ0 − n
[
max
l∈V,i∈N
sli + max{f(n− 1), f(1− n)}
]
− 1
2
(n− 1) max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 (40)
and n ≥ 2, then the Cournot equilibrium quantities (37) are nonnegative for all firms at all
locations and for all collaboration graphs and the following inequalities hold:
2dli(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (41)
2dli(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (42)
Proof: Since n ≥ 2 and f is convex and has a minimum at 0, this implies that n−1
n+1
[f(1)−
f(0)] and n−1
n+1
[f(−1)− f(0)] are non-negative. If (41) and (42) hold, then dli(g) is non-negative
and hence it suffices to only show that (41) and (42) are implied by (40).
For all i, function fi is a convex function of the degree of node i in the graph g; the degree
of node i must take an integer value between 0 and n − 1, which due to the convexity of
fi and the fact that ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . n − 1} implies that the maximum of fi is equivalent to
max{fi(0), fi(n− 1)} and is less than max{f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1)}. That is,
fi(ηi(g)) ≤ max{fi(ηi(g))} = max{fi(0), fi(n− 1)} ≤ max{f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1)} ∀i ∈ N
Further, sli ≤ maxl∈V,i∈N sli. This means that (40) implies:
α−γ0−n [sli + fi(ηi(g))]− 1
2
(n−1) max{f(1)−f(0), f(−1)−f(0)} > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (43)
Since, all fi(ηi(g)) ≥ 0 and all sli ≥ 0, we may add
∑
j 6=i[slj + fj(ηj(g))] to the left side of
(43) without changing the inequality:
α− γ0 − n [sli + fi(ηi(g))] +
∑
j 6=i
[slj + fj(ηj(g))]
− 1
2
(n− 1) max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (44)
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
14
Dividing by n+ 1 yields:
α− γ0 − n [sli + fi(ηi(g))] +
∑
j 6=i[slj + fj(ηj(g))]
n+ 1
− 1
2
n− 1
n+ 1
max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (45)
From Lemma III.2 this simplifies to:
dli(g)− 1
2
n− 1
n+ 1
max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0 ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V (46)
Multiplying through by two yields:
2dli(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V
2dli(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] ∀i ∈ N, l ∈ V
Now (41) and (42) immediately follow.
Remark III.4. It should be noted that this bound will often not be tight and hence demand
quantities may be positive even when it is not met.
Suppose that f is a convex function that has a minimum at 0. Further, suppose fi(ηi(g)) =
f(ηi(g)−ki). Define the change in f as4−fi(ki) = fi(ki−1)−fi(ki) = f(−1)−f(0) = 4−f(0)
and 4+fi(ki) = fi(ki + 1)− fi(ki) = f(1)− f(0) = 4+f(0). Suppose n ≥ 2 firms compete in
an oligopoly with market demand P = α−∑i∈N qi and marginal costs ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)).
If the parameters α and γ0 and the functions fi obey condition (16), then the equivalence
class of graphs [g]η such that ηi(g) = ki is an equivalence class of stable collaboration graphs.
The induced price at node l is denoted as Pl(Dl) = Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln). The marginal pro-
duction cost is ci(qi|g) = fi(qi, ηi(g)) as before in (9) but is now denoted as ci(
∑
l∈V dli|g) =
fi(
∑
l∈V dli, ηi(g)). However, now there is an additional marginal cost to ship a unit of quantity
to node l for firm i denoted as sli
Suppose we have an oligopoly consisting of n firms in which collaboration is defined by the
graph g, the demand function at node l is Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln) = αl −
∑
i∈N dli, and the profit
function (allocation rule) for Firm i in that oligopoly is given by:
Theorem III.5. Suppose that f is a nonnegative (f(η) ≥ 0) convex function that has a minimum
at 0. Further, suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)−ki). Define the change in f as4−fi(ki) = fi(ki−1)−
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fi(ki) = 4−f(0) = f(−1)−f(0) and 4+fi(ki) = fi(ki+1)−fi(ki) = 4+f(0) = f(1)−f(0).
Suppose n ≥ 2 firms compete in an oligopoly with market demand Pl(dl1, dl2, . . . , dln) = αl −∑
i∈N dli, marginal production cost of ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)), and marginal shipping cost of sli.
If the parameters α, γ0, and s as well as the function f obey condition (40), then the equivalence
class of graphs [g]η such that ηi(g) = ki is an equivalence class of stable collaboration graphs.
Proof: Let g be a graph in the equivalence class of graphs [g]η, that is, g has a degree
sequence such that ηi(g) = ki for all firms i. Consider a firm i who may consider dropping its
link with node j. If node i drops its link with node j leading to graph g−ij, then ηi(g−ij) = ki−1
and ηj(g − ij) = kj − 1, while ηr(g − ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}. Using Lemma III.2
dli =
αl − γ0 − n(sli + fi(ηi(g))) +
∑
j 6=i[slj + fj(ηj(g))]
n+ 1
(47)
Calculate:
dli(g − ij) = dli(g)−4−fi(ki)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4−fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
dlj(g − ij) = dlj(g)−4−fj(kj)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
dlr(g − ij) = dlr(g) +4−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+4−fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
It then follows that
Dl(g − ij) = Dl(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4−fi(ki) +4−fj(kj))
Pl(g − ij) = Pl(g) +
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4−fi(ki) +4−fj(kj))
ci(g − ij) = ci(g) +4−fi(ki)
Define Yi(g) =
∑
l∈V yli(g) where yli(g) = dli(g)[Pl(g) − ci(g) − sli]. Now, we can calculate
yli(g − ij) in terms of yli(g):
yli(g − ij) = dli(g − ij)[Pl(g − ij)− ci(g − ij)− sli]
= yli(g) + dli(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[4−fj(kj)− n4−fi(ki)] +
(
[4−fj(kj)− n4−fi(ki)]
n+ 1
)2
Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) this implies that 4−fi(ki) = 4−fj(kj) yielding (48) and then
(49) and (50) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, 4−fi(ki) and n−1n+1 are non-negative and
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by Corollary III.3, the term
(
2dli(g)− n−1n+14−fi(ki)
)
is non-negative as well. Hence, this implies
(51).
yli(g − ij)− yli(g) = 2dli(g)4−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (4−fi(ki))2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(48)
= 4−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)(
2dli(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
4−fi(ki)
)
(49)
= −4−fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2dli(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
4−fi(ki)
)
(50)
< 0 (51)
Since yli(g − ij) − yli(g) < 0 for all i, we can sum over all transport nodes l, to see that this
implies that node i does not have an incentive to drop a link.
yli(g − ij)− yli(g) < 0∑
l
yli(g − ij)−
∑
l
yli(g) < 0
Yi(g − ij)− Yi(g) < 0
This implies that if firm i attempts to drop link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g − ij) and thus firm i
decreases its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to drop
a link from graph g. Now, we will consider the case where firm i attempts to add a link to the
graph g, giving g + ij under the assumption that the link ij does not exist in graph g. This
analysis will follow closely the analysis for g − ij. First note that ηi(g) = ki for all firms i and
ηi(g + ij) = ki + 1 and ηj(g + ij) = kj + 1, while ηr(g + ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}. We define
4+fi(ki) as 4+fi(ki) = fi(k + 1) − fi(k); note the subtle difference from the definition of
4−fi(ki). Again using Lemma II.2, we calculate the production quantity for each node in graph
g + ij:
dli(g + ij) = dli(g)−4+fi(ki)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4+fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
dlj(g + ij) = dlj(g)−4+fj(kj)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+4+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
dlr(g + ij) = dlr(g) +4+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+4+fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
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We can then calculate the corresponding total production quantity Q, the market price P and
marginal costs for each player for the graph g + ij:
Dl(g + ij) = Dl(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4+fi(ki) +4+fj(kj))
Pl(g + ij) = Pl(g) +
(
1
n+ 1
)
(4+fi(ki) +4+fj(kj))
ci(g + ij) = ci(g) +4+fi(ki)
Now, we can calculate yli(g + ij) in terms of yli(g):
yli(g + ij) = dli(g + ij)[Pl(g + ij)− ci(g + ij)− sli]
= yli(g) + dli(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[4+fj(kj)− n4+fi(ki)] +
(
[4+fj(kj)− n4+fi(ki)]
n+ 1
)2
Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) this implies that 4+fi(ki) = 4+fj(kj) yielding (52) and then
(53) and (54) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, 4+fi(ki) and n−1n+1 are non-negative and
by Corollary III.3, the term
(
2dli(g)− n−1n+14+fi(ki)
)
is non-negative as well. Hence, this implies
(55).
yli(g + ij)− yli(g) = 2dli(g)4+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (4+fi(ki))2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(52)
= 4+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)(
2dli(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
4+fi(ki)
)
(53)
= −4+fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2dli(g)− n− 1
n+ 1
4+fi(ki)
)
(54)
< 0 (55)
Since yli(g + ij) − yli(g) < 0 for all i, we can sum over all transport nodes l, to see that this
implies that node i does not have an incentive to drop a link.
yli(g + ij)− yli(g) < 0∑
l
yli(g + ij)−
∑
l
yli(g) < 0
Yi(g + ij)− Yi(g) < 0
This implies that if firm i attempts to add a link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g+ij) and the firm decreases
its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to add a link to graph
g. Since no firm has an incentive to add or drop a link to graph g, it is stable. This completes
the proof.
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IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We present a numerical example of Theorem III.5. Let N = 5 firms compete in an oligopoly
with inverse demand function Pl = 103−
∑
i dli, fixed cost γ0 = 5, shipping costs sli = 1 ∀ li,
and fi(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g) − ki)2 + ψ where k = [2, 3, 4, 3, 2]T and ψ = 2. We want to test the
stability of a graph g with ηi(g) = ki and fi(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g) − ki)2 + ψ for each node i. Note
that f(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g))2 + ψ. The following calculations will be need:
α 103
γ0 5
n 5
maxl∈V,i∈N sli 1
f(n− 1) = f(4) = 42 + 2 18
f(1− n) = f(−4) = (−4)2 + 2 18
f(1) = 12 + 2 3
f(−1) = (−1)2 + 2 3
f(0) = 02 + 2 2
In order to invoke Corollary III.3, we must ensure condition (40) holds:
α− γ0 − n
[
max
l∈V,i∈N
sli + max{f(n− 1), f(1− n)}
]
− 1
2
(n− 1) max{f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)} > 0
Plugging in the appropriate values:
103− 5− 5 · [1 + max(18, 18)]− 1
2
(4) max{3− 2, 3− 2)} > 0
98− 5 · 19− 2 · 1 > 0
98− 95− 2 > 0
1 > 0
Condition (40) is met for this set of parameters and function f .
Two stable graphs, shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, have a degree sequence equivalent to k.
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Fig. 1. Collaboration Network
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5
Fig. 2. Collaboration Network 2
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we bridge the gap between collaborative network models and spatial models
by both extending the research in collaborative oligopoly network models [4] and [14], by
introducing the spatial transport network and by extending spatial oligopoly models [2], [11],
[15], [16], and by introducing firm collaboration. We have developed a generalized model using
variational inequalities and shown in a subset of cases, we can analytically show that we may
construct games that result in stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence.
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